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Application of the Medicare and Medicaid
Anti-Kickback Statute to Business
Arrangements Between Hospitals and
Hospital-Based Physicians
Hugh E. Aaron*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 1128B(b) of the Social Security Act,' better known as
the Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback statute or fraud and
abuse statute, broadly prohibits the knowing and willful offer, payment, solicitation, or receipt of remuneration in return for the referral of an individual for any item or service covered under the
Medicare or Medicaid programs.2 This statutory language is so
broad that the anti-kickback statute could easily be interpreted to
prohibit a wide range of traditionally accepted business arrangements involving healthcare providers.
The Office of the Inspector General ("OIG")3 of the Department
of Health and Human Services has been active in urging the courts
to adopt an expansive interpretation of the anti-kickback statute.
It appears that the courts have accommodated the OIG. The federal case law broadly interprets the statute to prohibit any exchange of remuneration where even one purpose of the
* Mr. Aaron is the Regional Operations Director of Compmed, a comprehensive
medical management company in the Richmond, Virginia area. He holds a Master's of
Health Administration from the Medical College of Virginia, and is in his third year of
law school at University of Richmond, where he serves on that law review's editorial
board. He is also the president of the University of Richmond Health Law Forum.
The author gratefully acknowledges Laura G. Aaron's editorial assistance in preparing
this article for publication. Ms. Aaron is an attorney with Mezzullo & McCandlish in
Richmond, Virginia.
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b) (West 1991).
2. Id. The Department of Health and Human Services typically uses the more generic term "State Health Care Program" when referring to Medicaid and other related
state healthcare programs. For purposes of this article, the term "Medicaid" will be used
to refer to all state healthcare programs.
3. The OIG operates as an independent unit within the Department of Health and
Human Services, responsible for "conducting investigations into suspected fraud or
abuse, performing audits and inspections of Departmental programs as well as data collection and analysis, special studies, and other functions designed to meet its overall mission." 3 Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) T 13,915, at 5,635.
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remuneration is to induce the referral of Medicare or Medicaid
recipients.
The OIG's efforts to broaden the reach of the anti-kickback statute are continuing. Its most recent effort concentrates on expanding the class of potential "referrers" to include hospitals and
similar health institutions. The OIG issued a management advisory report,4 which suggests that certain common business arrangements between hospitals and hospital-based physicians5
violate the anti-kickback statute. Specifically, the OIG has stated
that any arrangement that requires hospital-based physicians to
"split portions of their income with hospitals" or pay "far in excess
of the fair market value of services provided by the hospital" 6may
violate the statute and come under fraud and abuse scrutiny.
The hospital industry, through the American Hospital Association ("AHA"), has taken issue with the position of the OIG. 7 The
AHA contends that physicians, not hospitals, make referrals for
health services; therefore, the anti-kickback statute does not apply
to arrangements between hospitals and hospital-based physicians.'
This article focuses on the statutory prohibition against remuneration in return for referrals as it applies to the relationship between hospitals and hospital-based physicians. It will analyze the
4. Office of the Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services, Financial Arrangements Between Hospitals and Hospital-Based Physicians, Medicare &
Medicaid Guide (CCH) Transfer Binder 1992-1 39,669 (Oct., 1991) [hereinafter OIG
Management Advisory Report). The OIG sent an original management advisory report
to the Department of Health and Human Services, Health Care Financing Authority
("HCFA") on January 31, 1991 (found at Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) Transfer
Binder 1991 39,044). On March 11, 1991, Paul Rettig, Executive Vice-President of the
American Hospital Association, responded to the management advisory report. The report and Mr. Rettig's response were reviewed by HCFA, which issued comments on May
2, 1991. Mr. Rettig's letter and the HCFA comments can be found at Medicare Safe
Harbor Regulations on Fraud & Abuse, ABA FORUM ON HEALTH LAW, Section E
(Sept., 1991). In response to these comments as well as those received from the College
of American Pathologists, the OIG issued a revised report in October, 1991.
5. The term "hospital-based physicians" is typically used to refer to radiologists, anesthesiologists, pathologists, emergency medicine physicians, and, in some cases, teaching
physicians.
6. OIG Management Advisory Report, supra note 4, at 28,416. These arrangements
have been called "reverse kickbacks" since the application of the anti-kickback statute to
payments from physicians to hospitals is somewhat atypical. The more typical application of the statute would prohibit hospitals from paying physicians for referrals. See
Linda Perry, Virginia Legal Battle Highlights Unrest Between Hospitals, Physicians,MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Sept. 17, 1990, at 36.
7. March 11, 1991, letter from Paul Rettig, supra note 4. The American College of
Radiology and the American College of Pathology both issued position papers that
strongly support the Inspector General's position on this issue.
8. Id. at p. 2. See also OIG Memo Causes Concern in Health Care Circles, HOSPITAL,
May 20, 1991, at 66.
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anti-kickback statute and the positions of both the OIG and the
AHA regarding this controversy. Specifically, this article provides
a general background of the statute, reviews the elements of a violation of the statute and their application to arrangements between
hospitals and hospital-based physicians, discusses the application
of the "safe harbors" to business arrangements between hospitals
and hospital-based physicians, reviews relevant litigation involving
allegedly abusive business arrangements between hospitals and
hospital-based physicians, and analyzes several implications of applying the anti-kickback statute to business arrangements between
hospitals and hospital-based physicians.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

The Economics of Referral Power

One of the many unique characteristics of the healthcare industry lies in the fact that a third-party, not a consumer, often makes
the purchase decision. For example, if a physician determines that
a patient needs a diagnostic imaging service, the patient's attending
physician usually refers the patient to a radiologist for the diagnostic study. Similarly, if a patient needs a laboratory analysis of a
tissue sample, the patient's physician often arranges for a pathologist to conduct the study. In most cases, the patient follows his or
her "doctor's order" and complies with the "recommended" treatment course. Hence, it is the physician, not the consumer, who to
a large extent controls utilization of healthcare services and healthcare decision making.
A byproduct of this referral-driven approach to the purchase of
medical services is the temptation presented to referring physicians
to profit from their referral power. There are a number of ways in
which a physician can profit, either directly or indirectly, from this
referral source power. At one extreme, a referring provider might
demand some type of direct payment, based on the volume of business referred, from the provider who benefits from the referrals, the
classic "kickback." A less direct way for providers to reap the benefit of their referral power is through ownership of an equity interest in an entity to which the physician is in a position to direct
referrals.9 The more patients the provider directs to the entity, the
9. A common example of this type of arrangement is a free-standing diagnostic imaging center in which the principal shareholder (or general partner) sells shares (or limited
partnership interests) to physicians who are in a position to generate referrals to the
center.
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more revenue the entity generates and the greater the referring provider's return on investment.
Arrangements that enable providers to be compensated for their
referral power can cause harm in three ways. First, these types of
arrangements can result in the provision of unnecessary medical
services, referred to as "overutilization."' 0 Overutilization results
in an increase in cost to both the patient and the patient's health
insurance carrier by driving up the total cost of the patient's care.
In some cases, overutilization can also have a detrimental medical
effect on the patient's health."
Second, these types of arrangements can increase the cost of
health care by adding an additional layer of "profit" to the cost of
the item or service. Even where utilization is appropriate, compensating providers for referrals can still increase the cost per service if
the physician receiving the referral "marks-up" the price of the
service to cover the cost of the referral payment. Like overutilizacost to the pation, these types of referral payments increase the
12
tient and the patient's health insurance carrier.
Finally, these types of arrangements can unnecessarily restrict
the patient's freedom of choice. In situations where the referrer
has a financial incentive to refer to a particular provider, the patient may not be given a choice. Absent a referral incentive, the
physician might be more inclined to present the patient1 3 with a list
of options or at least learn of any patient preferences.
The payment of compensation in return for referrals can have a
substantial effect on the federal government since the government
pays for a significant portion of the healthcare services provided in
the United States. Payments by the federal government for healthcare services are made primarily through the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 14 Any arrangement that increases the cost of
10. OIG Management Advisory Report, supra note 4, at 28,416.
11. Id. at 28,416. McCarty Thornton, The Medicare/MedicaidAnti-Kickback Statute: An Enforcement Perspective, in 470 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, at 111 (1989)

(discussing, inter alia, the rationale behind the existence of the Medicare and Medicaid
anti-kickback statute).
12. OIG Management Advisory Report, supra note 4, at 28,416 to 28,417.
13. Thornton, supra note 11.
14. The Medicare program provides health insurance primarily to individuals who
are age 65 and older and who are entitled to retirement benefits under either the Social
Security or Railroad Retirement Acts. MARGARET GREENFIELD, MEDICARE AND
The Medicaid program provides health insurance coverage to individuals based on their financial
status. Medicaid is funded and administered jointly through a cooperative effort between
the federal and state governments. Id. at 105-125.
MEDICAID: THE 1965 AND 1967 SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS 2 (1968).
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providing services to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries increases the federal government's total healthcare cost.
B.

The Special Relationship Between Hospitals and HospitalBased Physicians

Unlike primary care and attending physicians, hospital-based
physicians typically are not in a position to refer patients to other
providers of healthcare services. More commonly, hospital-based
physicians, such as radiologists, anesthesiologists, and pathologists,
are the recipients of referrals from other physicians. Often, a hospital selects only one group of radiologists, one group of pathologists, and one group of anesthesiologists to provide services at a
given facility, and these physicians will receive all of the referrals
for services to be provided at the hospital. Hence, by selecting a
group of hospital-based physicians that will be the recipients of the
hospital's business, the hospital indirectly controls the flow of certain business.
Hospitals and hospital-based physicians frequently enter into
contractual relationships under which the hospital-based physicians agree to provide services to the hospital and the hospital's
patients.1 5 Often these arrangements are in the form of exclusive
contracts. While such contractual arrangements, by themselves,
do not violate the anti-kickback statute, fraud and abuse questions
can arise whenever a business arrangement results in any form of
payment that does not reflect fair market value flowing between the
physicians and the hospital.' 6 For example, a requirement that
hospital-based physicians purchase management and billing services from the hospital may be suspect under the anti-kickback statute. Similarly, contract provisions under which the physicians
agree to rent space or equipment from the hospital could be suspect. A hospital might also request or require the physicians to
make payments that are unrelated to any services, equipment, or
facilities provided by the hospital, such as "donations" to charita15. These arrangements are frequently made through contracts that give the hospitalbased physicians an exclusive franchise to provide services within the hospital, some of
which provide for an exclusive right to use the hospital's equipment. These types of
relationships will be referred to throughout this article as business arrangements between
hospitals and hospital-based physicians. The term "business arrangements" as used in
this article does not include joint ventures between hospitals and hospital-based physicians in outpatient facilities.
16. See OIG Management Advisory Report, supra note 4, at 28,416 to 28,417 (OIG
findings regarding the types of suspect business relationships that may exist between hospitals and hospital-based physicians).
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ble foundations operated by the hospital. 7 These types of payments that would, in essence, constitute a franchise fee have been
specifically condemned by the 01G.
C. Development of the Anti-Kickback Statute and Regulations
The anti-kickback statute, originally enacted in 1972, represents
an attempt by Congress to curb abusive referral arrangements of
the type discussed above. The original statute established criminal
sanctions for the solicitation, receipt, offer, or payment of kickbacks, bribes, or rebates in return for referrals."' In 1977, the
scope of the statute was broadened to prohibit not only kickbacks
and bribes, but any remuneration offered, paid, solicited, or received in return for referrals.1 9 Despite the broad scope of the antikickback statute after the 1977 amendments, there was very little
enforcement action in the ten years following the amendments. 20
In 1987, Congress enacted three additional amendments to the
fraud and abuse provisions. First, Congress gave the Department
of Health and Human Services ("DHHS"), through the OIG, the
ability to exclude providers from participation in the Medicare and
Medicaid programs for violation of the anti-kickback law. 21 Second, Congress gave the OIG the ability to impose civil penalties for
violations of the anti-kickback statute.2 2 Finally, Congress instructed the DHHS to publish regulations defining business arrangements that would be protected from criminal prosecution or
civil sanctions under the broad anti-kickback statute.23
17.
18.
19.
§ 4, 91

Id. at 28,415; see Perry, supra note 6, at 34-36.
Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419 (1972).
Medicare and Medicaid Antifraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142,
Stat. 1175, 1179 (1977).

20. SANFORD V. TEPLITZKY & EUGENE TILLMAN, DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTIKICKBACK PROVISIONS vii (1989) (attributing the lack of enforcement action to the fact

that neither the Health Care Financing Administration nor the OIG believed that they
had the authority to interpret a criminal statute).
21. Pub. L. No. 95-142, sec. 2, 101 Stat. 680 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1320a-7). For many providers, exclusion from participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs represents financial disaster, since Medicare and Medicaid revenues often
account for a significant portion of the provider's total revenues.
22. Id. at sec. 3, 101 Stat. 686 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a).
23. Id. at sec. 14, 101 Stat. 697. The legislative history of the Medicare and Medicaid
Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987 indicates that Congress felt that it was necessary for the DHHS to define protected business arrangements since the breadth of the
anti-kickback statue had "created uncertainty among health care providers as to which
commercial arrangements are legitimate, and which are proscribed." S. REP. No. 109,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 682, 707.
After several years of delay, these regulations were published in the form of 11 "safe
harbors." 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (1991); see also Medicare and State Health Care Pro-
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III.

THE ELEMENTS OF AN ANTI-KICKBACK VIOLATION AND
THEIR APPLICATION TO HOSPITAL-BASED PHYSICIANS

There are three elements necessary to establish a violation of the
anti-kickback statute. The business arrangement must (1) involve
the offer, payment, solicitation, or receipt of remuneration that (2)
is made in return for or to induce the referral of Medicare or Medicaid patients; finally, (3) the offer, payment, solicitation,
or receipt
24
willful.
and
knowing
be
must
of remuneration
A.

The "'Remuneration"Requirement

As originally enacted, the anti-kickback statute prohibited only
those arrangements that involved either a kickback or a bribe.
However, in 1977, the statute was expanded to prohibit not only
direct kickbacks and bribes, but any remuneration paid or received
in return for referrals. The meaning of the term "remuneration"
has been broadly interpreted to encompass almost anything of
value.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided one of the first cases
to address the meaning of "remuneration. ' 25 A cardiologist, Dr.
Greber, appealed his criminal conviction under the anti-kickback
statute. In addition to practicing medicine, Greber owned a company that provided diagnostic services to other physicians' patients. Greber's company billed Medicare directly and forwarded
an "interpretation fee" to the referring physician for consultation
services and for reporting the test results to the patient. Greber
argued that in order for the court to find that he had violated the
anti-kickback statute, the government had to show that "the only
purpose behind the [interpretation] fee was to improperly induce
future services .
"...26 Greber contended that compensating a
physician for services actually rendered could not violate the
statute.
The OIG countered that the interpretation fee constitutes "remuneration" in exchange for referrals if one purpose of the payment was to induce a referral. According to the OIG, this is true
grams: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions; Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952
(1991); Michael W. Peregrine et al., Safe Harborsfor Toy Boats: An Analysis and Commentary, 24 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 297 (1991); Deborah Robinson, Safe Harbors or
Empty Harbors?,Hosp. L. NEWSL., at 1, Dec., 1991.
24. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(l)-(2). The statute prohibits any type of remuneration
in return for referrals whether "directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in
kind." Id.
25. United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985).
26. Id. at 71.
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even if the remuneration also compensates a referring physician for
services actually performed.
The Third Circuit adopted the OIG's view and upheld Greber's
conviction noting that "remuneration" includes not only sums for
which no actual service was performed, but also those amounts for
which some professional service was rendered. The court concluded that a payment violated the statute if the payment was intended in induce referrals, even if the payment was also intended as
compensation for services rendered.27
The Greber court's interpretation of "remuneration" has been
expressly adopted by both the Ninth 28 and First 29 circuits. The
Greber test has also been expressly adopted in an administrative
sanction case heard by the Health and Human Services Departmental Appeals Board, where the Board defined remuneration to
include "offering 3or
paying anything of value in any form or man0
ner whatsoever.
In all likelihood, the Greber standard will continue to be the test
applied by the courts and by administrative law judges, even in the
case of hospital-based physicians. In applying the Greber test to
business arrangements between hospitals and hospital-based physicians, courts will most likely scrutinize the subjective intent of the
parties to the arrangement.
B.

The "In Return for Referrals" Requirement

To violate the anti-kickback statute, the offer or payment must
be made "to induce" referrals while the solicitation or receipt of
remuneration must be made "in return for" the referral of Medi27. Id. at 71-72. The Greber court concluded that Congress specifically included the
term remuneration in the statute to include situations where some service is actually
rendered. It noted that the difference between a kickback and remuneration is that no
service is rendered in return for a kickback while some service is actually rendered in
return for remuneration. The court explained that "[b]y adding 'remuneration' to the
statute in the 1977 amendment, Congress sought to make it clear that even if the transaction was not considered to be a 'kickback' for which no service had been rendered, payment nevertheless violated the [Social Security] Act." Id. at 72.
28. United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989).
29. United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20
(1st Cir. 1989).
30. In re Inspector General v. Hanlester Network, Docket No. C-448, Decision No.
1347 (H.H.S. Departmental Appeals Board, Appellate Division, July 24, 1992), aff'g in
part, rev'g in part Docket No. C-448, Decision No. CR 181 (H.H.S. Departmental Appeals Board, Civil Remedies Division, Mar. 10, 1992), on remandfrom Docket Nos. C186 through C-192, No. C-208, & No. C-213, Decision No. 1275 (H.H.S. Departmental
Appeals Board, Appellate Division, Sept. 18, 1991). An appeal of the July 24 decision
has been filed in federal court.
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care or Medicaid patients. 3' These parallel provisions will apply to
different conduct depending on whether an individual is offering
remuneration to induce a referral or is receiving payment in return
for a referral.
Whether hospitals are able to exact payments from hospitalbased physicians "in return for referrals" is the principal point of
disagreement between the OIG and the hospital industry. The
OIG maintains that hospitals are in a position to influence referrals
and therefore come within the statute.3 2 The AHA argues that
other physicians, not hospitals, refer patients; therefore, arrangements between hospitals and hospital-based physicians cannot violate the statute.33 At the time this article was written, the courts
had not yet addressed this conflict.
The AHA also argues that the underlying purpose of the antikickback statute, that of avoiding overutilization, is not impacted
by the arrangements between hospitals and hospital-based physicians. According to the AHA, there are no studies or reports that
document an increase in utilization of services because of arrangements between hospitals and hospital-based physicians. This is in
contrast to physician ownership and referral arrangements. The
AHA concluded that because increases in utilization have not been
demonstrated, the anti-kickback statute is not implicated. 34 However, actual harm to the program or overutilization of services is
not required to establish a violation of the anti-kickback statute. 35
The OIG acknowledges that hospital-based physicians "obtain
referrals from other specialists practicing at their hospital."36
However, the OIG interprets the application of the anti-kickback
statute's "in return for referral" requirement to be broader than
merely applying to those in a position to make direct referrals. The
OIG contends that the statute applies to anyone in a position to
"materially influence the flow of Medicare and Medicaid business." 37 The OIG asserts that hospitals "are in such a position ...
since they typically can name [which hospital-based physicians]
will be the recipient of the flow of business generated at the
hospital. 38
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(l)-(2).
See OIG Management Advisory Report, supra note 4, at 28,415.
March 11, 1991, letter from Paul Rettig, supra note 4, at 2.
Id. at 3.
Hanlester, Docket No. C-448, Decision No. CR 181, at 25.
OIG Management Advisory Report, supra note 4, at 28,415.
Id.
Id.

Published by LAW eCommons, 1992

9

Annals
of 1Health
Annals of Health
Law, Vol.
[1992], Iss.Law
1, Art. 5

[Vol. I

To support its conclusion, the OIG relies on United States v. Bay
State Ambulance and Hospital Rental Services, Inc.39 In Bay State,
the First Circuit upheld the anti-kickback criminal conviction of
an employee of a city-owned hospital." The employee, Felci, had
been instrumental in the hospital's decision to award an ambulance
contract to a local company. Before and after the contract was
awarded, Felci received two cars and numerous cash payments
from the ambulance company. It was the hospital, not Felci, that
entered into the contract with the ambulance company. Nevertheless, Felci was convicted based on his ability to influence the hospital in its decision to award the contract to Bay State. The OIG has
interpreted Bay State to mean the referral requirement of the antikickback statute is not limited to those in a position to make direct
referrals but rather can be satisfied by those in a position to exert
influence over the referral decision.41
Additional support for the position of the OIG is found in the
Hanlester case. In the first administrative sanction decision rendered, the DHHS Departmental Appeals Board broadly defined
the phrase "to induce" as "an intent to exercise influence over the
reason or judgement of another in an effort to cause the referral of
program-related business."42 This definition leaves ample room for
the inducement/in return for requirement to be interpreted to apply to any individual or entity that is in a position to influence the
flow of Medicare and Medicaid business.
C.

The "Knowing and Willful" Requirement

As originally enacted by Congress, the anti-kickback statute did
not require that the conduct proscribed by the statute be knowing
and willful. 4 3 Congress modified the anti-kickback statute, in re-

sponse to concerns that criminal penalties may be applied to conduct that was not intended to violate the law, 44 requiring a
knowing and willful violation of the statute.45
39. 874 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989).
40. Id. at 36.
41. OIG Management Advisory Report, supra note 4, at 28,415.
42. Hanlester, Docket No. C-448, Decision No. CR 181, at 56, aff'd, Docket No. C448, Decision No. 1347, at 11.
43. Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419; see generally Stephen C. Pierce,
United States v. Greber and its Effect on the Medicare and Medicaid Programs,75 Ky.
L.J. 677, 680-94 (1986-87) (discussing the history of the scienter requirement in the antikickback statute).
44. H.R. REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 5572.
45. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, sec. 316, 94 Stat. 2599.
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While the purpose of the knowing and willful requirement is to
establish the element of scienter,46 in reality a much more stringent
scienter-type requirement is already present in the statute. As recognized by the court in Bay State, the offer, payment, solicitation,
or receipt of remuneration does not violate the anti-kickback statute unless at least one purpose of the payment was to induce referrals. This specific requirement imposes a much stronger showing
of scienter than the traditional showing required to prove knowing
and willful conduct. If a court concludes that at least one purpose
of an offer, solicitation, payment, or receipt of remuneration was
for the purpose of inducing referrals, almost certainly the knowing
and willful requirement under the statute will have been satisfied.4"
IV.

POSSIBLE SAFE HARBOR PROTECTION

As a result of the broad sweep of the anti-kickback statute, Congress directed DHHS to promulgate regulations that would establish "safe harbors" for certain business arrangements that would
not be subject to prosecution. In response to Congress's directive,
the OIG published eleven safe harbors that describe specific scenarios protected from fraud and abuse scrutiny. If the conduct complies with each requirement of a safe harbor provision, the conduct
will not be subject to criminal prosecution or civil sanctions.
While most arrangements will not comply with all the safe harbor
requirements, these arrangements are not necessarily in violation
of the statute. Arrangements not covered by the safe harbors may
or may not violate the statute depending on the circumstances.49
Each safe harbor defines a situation or business arrangement in
which payment will not be considered as remuneration under the
anti-kickback statute. Three of the safe harbors, (1) personal services and management contracts, (2) space rental, and (3) equipment rental, are potentially applicable to business arrangements
between hospitals and hospital-based physicians.5"
46. Bay State Ambulance, 874 F.2d at 33.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. The general comments published in conjunction with the safe harbor regulations
make it clear that business arrangements are not protected unless each of the individual
conditions for the applicable safe harbor are met. The statute, not the regulations, define
the scope of unlawful activities; the safe harbor regulations do not expand the scope of
the anti-kickback statute. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,952, 35,954.
50. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (1991). The employee safe harbor, protecting the remuneration that flows between employer and employee, may also have some potential applicability in a limited number of states. However, in many states, the "corporate practice of
medicine" doctrine prohibits the employment of physicians by non-professional corpora-
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By structuring business arrangements to meet each of the required standards of either the personal services and management
contracts, 5 ' space rental, 2 or equipment renta 5 3 safe harbor, hostions, including hospitals. See generally, Alanson W. Willcox, Hospitals and the Corporate Practice of Medicine, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 432 (1960). Accordingly, the usefulness of
the employee exception to the fraud and abuse statute may be limited.
51. There are six requirements that must be met for a business arrangement to fall
within the personal services and management contracts safe harbor:
(1) The agency agreement is set out in writing and signed by the parties.
(2) The agency agreement specifies the services to be provided by the agent.
(3) If the agency agreement is intended to provide for the services of the agent
on a periodic, sporadic or part-time basis, rather than on a full-time basis
for the term of the agreement, the agreement specifies exactly the schedule
of such intervals, their precise length, and the exact charge for such
intervals.
(4) The term of the agreement is for not less than one year.
(5) The aggregate compensation paid to the agent over the term of the agreement is set in advance, is consistent with fair market value in arms-length
transactions and is not determined in a manner that takes into account the
volume or value of any referrals or business otherwise generated between
the parties for which payment may be made in whole or in part under Medicare or a State health care program.
(6) The services performed under the agreement do not involve the counseling
or promotion of a business arrangement or other activity that violates any
State or Federal law.
42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d).
52. There are five requirements that must be met for a business arrangement to fall
within the space rental safe harbor:
(1) The lease agreement is set out in writing and signed by the parties.
(2) The lease specifies the premises covered by the lease.
(3) If the lease is intended to provide the lessee with access to the premises for
periodic intervals of time, rather than on a full-time basis for the term of the
lease, the lease specifies exactly the schedule of such intervals, their precise
length, and the exact rent for such intervals.
(4) The term of the lease is for not less than one year.
(5) The aggregate rental charge is set in advance, is consistent with fair market
value in arms-length transactions and is not determined in a manner that
takes into account the volume or value of any referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under Medicare or a State health care program.
Id. at § 1001.952(b). The term "fair market value" is defined in this subsection.
53. There are five requirements that must be met for a business arrangement to fall
within the equipment rental safe harbor:
(1) The lease agreement is set out in writing and signed by the parties.
(2) The lease specifies the equipment covered by the lease.
(3) If the lease is intended to provide the lessee with use of the equipment for
periodic intervals of time, rather than on a full-time basis for the term of the
lease, the lease specifies exactly the schedule of such intervals, their precise
length, and the exact rent for such interval.
(4) The term of the lease is for not less than one year.
(5) The aggregate rental charge is set in advance, is consistent with fair market
value in arms-length transactions and is not determined in a manner that
takes into account the volume or value of any referrals or business other-
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pitals should be able to provide billing and management services,
lease space, or lease equipment to a hospital-based physician group
without risking a violation of the anti-kickback statute. However,
these arrangements must be structured carefully to assure that (1)
the hospital-based physicians pay fair market value for all services,
space, and equipment, and (2) payment is not tied to the physicians' volume of business.
These three safe harbors are particularly useful in structuring
business arrangements given the broad definition of remuneration
that has been adopted by the federal circuit courts. Without safe
harbor protection, common business arrangements under which
hospital-based physicians agree to purchase billing or management
services, lease space, or lease equipment from the hospital at fair
market value could be held to violate the anti-kickback statute if
one purpose of the arrangement was a subjective intent to induce
referrals.
There is no safe harbor protection for an arrangement that requires hospital-based physicians to make payments that are unrelated to the provision of any goods or services by the hospital. In
this type of arrangement, the hospital is essentially charging the
physicians for the privilege of practicing at the hospital, the clearest example of the types of abusive arrangements that the antikickback statute is designed to prohibit. While there is no safe harbor protection where payments made to a hospital are based on the
volume of business done by the physicians,54 failure to comply does
not render a violation. Each such transaction would have to be
analyzed under the statute based on its circumstances. Finally,
any arrangement not based on fair market value is inherently suspect given the fair market value requirement found in the safe harbor regulations and the courts' expansive definition of the term
"remuneration" as used in the anti-kickback statute.
V.

OFFENSIVE USE OF THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE:
RELEVANT LITIGATION

At the time this article was written, two unusual cases dealing
with the issue of potential fraud and abuse violations in business
wise generated between the parties for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under Medicare or a State health care program.
Id. at § 1001.952(e). The term "fair market value" is defined in this subsection.
54. 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,976. This type of arrangement is expressly excluded from safe
harbor protection even where the hospital provides goods or services to the physicians at
fair market value. Id. at 35,973, 35,985.
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arrangements between hospitals and hospital-based physicians
made their way into court." In Virginia Radiology Associates v.
Culpeper Memorial Hospital,56 a hospital-based radiology group,
Virginia Radiology Associates, brought a civil suit against Culpeper Memorial Hospital alleging that the hospital terminated the
radiologists' privileges because they refused to participate in a
kickback arrangement. The case was styled in part as a breach of
contract action, and was not an attempt to seek private enforcement of the anti-kickback statute. The radiologists relied on the
alleged violation of the anti-kickback statute to bolster their breach
of contract claim.
Virginia Radiology Associates alleged that the hospital attempted to force the physicians to purchase practice management
services from a hospital-owned company for a fee equal to fifty
percent of Virginia Radiology Associates's billings in excess of
$300,000 per year. Virginia Radiology Associates claimed that the
practice management services were unnecessary, and that even if
the services had been necessary, the hospital's fee far exceeded the
fair market value of the services. Thus, according to Virginia Radiology Associates, the required contract term violated the antikickback law and the hospital's termination of Virginia Radiology
Associates's privileges was improper. As of October, 1992, Virginia Radiology had not yet reached trial and was still pending in
Culpeper County, Virginia circuit court.
In a case factually similar to Virginia Radiology, a hospital-based
radiology group in California filed a civil suit against Anaheim
General Hospital alleging that a marketing fee charged to the radiologist was actually a disguised kickback in violation of the antikickback statute. 7 The hospital terminated the radiologist's exclusive contract after the radiologist refused to pay the hospital an
$8,000 monthly fee for marketing services. In response, the hospital claimed that the payments were required to lower the hospital's
operational costs by asking the radiologists to cover some of the
55. In United States v. Kensington Hospital, 760 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. Pa. 1991), the
Justice Department brought an action under, inter alia, the Anti-Kickback Act of 1986,
41 U.S.C.A. § 51-58 (West 1987), alleging that the hospital required its physicians to
"kick back" a percentage of their salaries as a "donation" to the hospital. The AntiKickback Act of 1986 regulates contractual relationships between government contractors and the federal government. The court dismissed the Anti-Kickback action, holding
that Congress never intended it to apply to the types of relationships that exist between
healthcare providers and the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 760 F. Supp. at 1140.
56. No. 90-L-172 (Cir. Ct. Culpeper County, Va., filed Aug. 8, 1990).
57. Pacific Coast Radiology v. Anaheim General Hosp., Case No. 666585 (Orange
County Superior Ct., Cal., filed Aug. 22, 1991).
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hospital's marketing costs. As of October, 1992, the case was still
pending.
Both Virginia Radiology and Anaheim General Hospital are significant as they are both attempts by hospital-based physicians to
use the anti-kickback statute offensively in civil actions between
private parties. If the physician groups in these cases are successful, hospital-based physicians may have a tool with which to fend
off attempts by hospitals to tap into the hospital-based physicians'
revenues. Now that the OIG has formally taken the position that
these types of business arrangements can violate the anti-kickback
statute, hospital-based physician groups may become more aggressive in their use of the anti-kickback statute to avoid financial demands placed on them by hospitals. 58
VI.

IMPLICATIONS FOR HOSPITALS AND HOSPITAL-BASED
PHYSICIANS

The OIG made it clear that it believes certain business arrangements between hospitals and hospital-based physicians violate the
anti-kickback statute.5 9 While the report issued is not legally binding on either hospitals or physicians, 6° at present it appears that the
courts may be inclined to agree with the OIG's position. Given the
direction of the recent federal court decisions and the societal attitude toward increasing health care costs, the OIG may now be
ready to test its position in the courts. 6 1 The possibility of OIG
58. William A. Gravely, Jr., the Chief Executive Officer of Culpeper Memorial Hospital, commented bluntly that he thinks physicians will use the OIG memorandum " 'as a
club' " when negotiating their contracts with the hospitals. OIG Memo Causes Concern,
supra note 8, at 68. "'Any physician not inclined to talk about [a contract] is going to hit
the [hospital] CEO with the OIG memo.'" Id.
59. Hospital-based physicians and hospitals in particular should also be wary of the
recent attempts of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to join the fraud and abuse
enforcement effort. In a recent general counsel memorandum, the IRS ruled that a hospital may endanger its tax exempt status by entering into an arrangement that violates the
anti-kickback statute. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991). While the ruling itself
was limited to particular factual situations, it sets the tone for future fraud and abuse
enforcement by the IRS. The IRS has focused increasingly on potentially abusive arrangements between non-profit hospitals and physicians. See generally Richard Pinto &
Marsha Novick, IRS Standards for Joint Ventures With For-Profit Partners, J. TAX'N
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, Winter 1992, at 43.

60. The OIG does not have the authority to define illegal business arrangements. The
Medicare Patient Protection Act of 1987 merely gives the Department of Health and
Human Services the authority to impose civil sanctions for violations of the anti-kickback
statute and to define certain arrangements that do not violate the statute, the safe harbor
regulations.
61. The OIG recommended that the Health Care Financing Administration
("HCFA") instruct its intermediaries (i.e., private insurance companies that contract
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action may be particularly likely now that the safe harbor regulations are established without a safe harbor to protect the types of
suspect business arrangements between hospitals and hospitalbased physicians discussed in the management advisory report.
The types of business arrangements prohibited under the antikickback statute involve the solicitation, receipt, offer, or payment
of remuneration. Should the OIG initiate enforcement action
targeted at a business arrangement between a hospital and hospital-based physicians, it is likely that both the hospital (as the party
soliciting or receiving the remuneration) and the hospital-based
physicians (as the party offering or paying the remuneration)
would be named as defendants. The fact that the physicians may
have entered into the arrangement begrudgingly may not go far in
relieving the physicians of liability under the anti-kickback statute.
A successful suit by the OIG challenging a particular business
arrangement between a hospital and a hospital-based physician
group may also have an additional, potentially far reaching effect
on joint venture arrangements involving hospitals and other health
care providers. 62 For a court to hold that a particular business arrangement between a hospital and a hospital-based physician
group violates the anti-kickback statute, the court must find that
hospitals, in certain circumstances, constitute "referrers," as that
term is used in the anti-kickback statute. In turn, such a finding
would mean that in certain circumstances, hospital ownership in
an independent outpatient facility could potentially violate the
anti-kickback statute.63
with HCFA to administer Medicare claims) to "refer cases similar to the examples given
[in the report], or any other suspect arrangements to the OIG for possible prosecution or
sanction." OIG Managment Advisory Report, supra note 4, at 28,417.
62. Abusive joint venture arrangements have traditionally been one of the prime
targets of attack under the anti-kickback statute. See generally Robinson, supra note 23,
at 1.
63. While a discussion of joint venture arrangements is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that the analysis of whether a hospital is a "referrer" in the context
of a joint venture arrangement may differ from the analysis required in evaluating the
types of business arrangements discussed in this article. A finding that a hospital is a
referrer in the context of business arrangements between hospitals and hospital-based
physicians would most likely be based on the indirect referral power flowing from the
hospital's ability to control the "franchise" to provide hospital-based specialists' services
within the hospital. On the other hand, a finding that a hospital is a referrer within the
context of a joint venture would require a finding of a more direct type of referral power.
In other words, the court would have to find that the hospital is in a position to directly
influence the determination of where the patient goes to obtain healthcare services.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

The OIG has recognized that improper business arrangements
between hospitals and hospital-based physicians can potentially
impact the Medicare and Medicaid programs in at least three different ways.' First, these arrangements create a conflict of interest
for the hospital. While a hospital's decision to award an exclusive
contract to a hospital-based physician group should be based on
the quality of services that the physicians can provide to the hospital's patients, business arrangements such as those discussed in this
article create an incentive for the hospital to consider its own financial interests in awarding exclusive contracts to hospital-based physicians. Second, these arrangements tend to create an incentive for
the hospital to encourage utilization of the hospital-based physicians' services, which can result in overutilization of certain services. The OIG noted that some of these types of arrangements may
create an incentive for hospital-based physicians to attempt to
recoup their "franchise fee" by encouraging unnecessary services.
Finally, illegal arrangements can affect physician fees since the
costs are inflated and do not reflect fair market value.
In their never ending search for revenue sources, hospital administrators may be tempted to "cash in" when determining which
hospital-based specialists will provide services in their hospitals.
However, any attempt to profit from these arrangements may come
under OIG scrutiny and could result in civil sanctions or criminal
prosecution for violation of the Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback statute.

64.

OIG Management Advisory Report, supra note 4, at 28,416 to 28,417.
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